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I.

INTRODUCTION

Churches and other religious organizations are exempt from taxation under
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Given such an advantage, it

is not surprising that many tax avoidance schemes have clothed themselves in
clerical garb.' Unlike other tax-shelter devices, which generally present only
technical issues of statutory interpretation, tax controversies involving religious
organizations often raise sensitive and difficult constitutional questions. While
the government strives to protect its revenue from cynical parodies of religion,
the Constitution requires that unorthodox and unconventional beliefs be protected from overzealous tax collectors.

* Associate Professor, DePaul University, College of Law, B.A., 1965, M.A., 1968, New
York University; J.D., 1974, Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., 1977, Georgetown.
1. Organizations that are exempt from taxation under I.R.C. S 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC) are generally also classified as organizations to which tax deductible contributions may be made under I.R.C. S 170. Under S 107, it is also possible for a minister to
exclude the fair market rental value of a home that is provided by a congregation. See Note, Mail
Order Ministries, The Religious Purpose Exemption and the Constitution, 33 TAx LAw. 959 (1980) for a
discussion of how many organizations are achieving these benefits as well as the IRS' response.
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The difficulty in balancing these interests is illustrated in Church of Scientology
v. Commissioner.2 In Church of Scientology, the IRS revoked the church's tax-exempt
status after years of investigation, litigation and audits. The revocation was
based on the church's failure to satisfy the express and implied requirements
of section 501(c)(3). 3 The church countered that the religion clauses of the first
amendment bar the IRS action since it was motivated by a hostility to particular
religious practices. Additionally, the church contended that the statute's criteria
are unconstitutional when applied to churches.
The Church of Scientology decision did not question the validity or sincerity
of the church's beliefs and practices; the Tax Court conceded their religiosity.'
Although many ancillary questions were involved,' the basic issues concerned

2. 83 T.C. 381 (1984).
3. Organizations that are exempt from taxation under I.R.C. § 501(a) are described in
I.R.C. 5 501(c)(3). Although these organizations are ordinarily referred to as "charitable," I.R.C.
S 501(c)(3) defines them as follows:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition... or
for the prevention of cruelty to animals....
Some of the flavor of the case as well as the positions of the parties can be gotten from a
review of their pretrial statements. L. Ron Hubbard, the founder and leader of worldwide Scientology, provided his adherents with the following advice on tax matters:
Now as to TAX, why this is mainly anybody's game of what is PROFIT. The thing
to do is to assign a significance to the figures before the government can. The whole thing
is a mess only because arithmetic figures are symbols open to ANY significance. So I
normally think of a better significance than the government can. I always put enough
errors on a return to satisfy their blood-sucking appetite and STILL come out zero. The
game of accounting is just a game of assigning significances to figures. The man with the
most imagination wins....
Income tax is a suppressive effort to crush individuals and businesses and deprive the
state of gross national produce (since none can expand). The thing which baffles any
suppressive is truth. It's the only thing that works....
Income does not mean profit. One can and should make all the INCOME one possibly
can. Always. The only crime really is to be broke. But when one makes INCOME be
sure it is accounted for as to its source and that one covers it with expenses and debts.
Handling taxation is as simple as that.
83 T.C. at 430 n.30 (emphasis in original).
On the other side, evidence of the IRS' feelings may be found in a number of derogatory statements
about Scientology appearing in IRS memoranda and correspondence. Among these were comments
denouncing Scientology as "a threat to the community, medically, morally and socially," and as
a "grabbag of philosophical voodooism." Id. at 405. The government's trial memorandum maintained that the church's practice of auditing inflicted psychic harm through "brainwashing," id.
at 449, and dissolution of marriage and family ties.
4. 83 T.C. at 462. The IRS had inquired into the religiosity of certain practices, but the issue
was not raised at trial. The court concluded that a threshold inquiry did not interfere with the
church's beliefs because the inquiry was dropped when witnesses asserted the practices did have
a religious purpose.
5. Id. at 444. These issues involved technical questions about the IRS' notice of deficiency;
constitutional questions regarding the burden of proof; retroactive application of statutory constructions; numerous fact questions as to whether church activities included a substantial commercial
purpose and whether its net earning inured to the benefit of private individuals.
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the government's statutory and constitutional power to tax churches. These

issues may be framed as follows:
1. Was the IRS' action constitutionally impermissible because it was
motivated by hostility to the religious practices and beliefs of Scientology?
2. Does the First Amendment prohibit the taxation of income derived from and used for religious purposes?
3. Is section 501(c)(3) unconstitutional to the extent that it disallows
tax exemptions for churches whose religious activities generate substantial
profits?
4. Is it constitutionally permissible to read into section 5 01(c)(3) an
implied requirement that tax-exempt churches conform to fundamental
public policies?
This article will discuss these questions.
II.

BACKGROUND

Scientology maintains that part of the unconscious mind, called the "reactive
mind," is the source of irrational behavior. An individual seeking spiritual
competence can eliminate the "engrams" of the reactive mind through the
process of "auditing" which is administered by trained Scientologists called
"auditors." The auditor identifies specific areas of spiritual difficulty through
an electronic device called an "E-meter." This instrument measures the individual's skin responses during question and answer sessions.'
As auditing progresses, the individual obtains higher levels of spiritual awareness. Each level of awareness requires auditors with higher levels of training.
However, a major tenet of Scientology is the "doctrine of exchange" which
holds that persons must pay for what they receive. Consequently, the church
7
requires payment of a "fixed donation" in return for all auditing and training,
These donations generate substantial earnings for the church and its sister organizations.
The Church of Scientology of California is only one part of the worldwide
Scientology organization. Nevertheless, it is the largest and most important part
and often was referred to as the "mother church." 8 Initially L. Ron Hubbard
and a number of close associates controlled church affairs from headquarters
aboard a ship. Hubbard, his family, staff and the ship's crew lived aboard the

6.

Id. at 385. The earliest litigation involving Scientology was an action by the Food and

Drug Administration seeking to regulate the E-meters (actually skin galvonometers which are used
to measure emotional responses) as medical devices. It appears probable that Scientology was
reorganized into a church partially to avoid these problems by characterizing the E-meters as
religious devices and auditing as a religious practice. Founding Church of Scientology v. United

States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
7. 83 T.C. at 386.
8.

Id,at 385,
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ship. Although Hubbard officially resigned from his official church positions in
1966, the Tax Court found that he still controlled church policy and operations.
This control was particularly evident in church financial affairs. Hubbard's
approval was required for all financial planning and he remained a signatory
on church bank accounts. 9
In 1972, following several unfavorable rulings by the IRS, high church
officers carried out a number of obstructionist and illegal actions designed to
thwart further financial audits and investigations.' ° These actions included burglaries of government offices and planting a Scientology official as a secretary
in an IRS office. Several persons were convicted and imprisoned as a result
of these activities."
During this period, the 'IRS actively investigated the church. The church
was rigorously scrutinized by three special intelligence units.' 2 The intelligence
units classified the Church of Scientology as a "tax resister" and placed materials about Scientology in a file labeled "Subversives."'"
III.

SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT BASED UPON HOSTILITY TO RELIGION

A.

Denial of Equal Protection'4

Upon the revocation of its tax exempt status, the church claimed that the
IRS was motivated by hostility to Scientology,"' violating both the equal pro-

9. Id.at 389.
10. Id.at 434.
11. Id.at 435.
12. Id. at 449. These units often selected taxpayers for special scrutiny based on political
criteria. Many dissident and politically active groups were monitored. Id. at 411-12.
13. Id. at 450.
14. Although the equal protection clause is found in the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme
Court has made it expressly applicable to actions of the Federal government through the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S 497 (1954).
15. Some of the history of the continuous controversy between the IRS and the Church of
Scientology is reviewed in Schwartz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions: When Should theChurch Rendr
Unto Caesar, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 50, 103 (1976).
It may be interesting to note that Scientology has been involved in similar disputes in other
parts of the world. In Australia, a Board of Enquiry appointed by the government condemned the
psychological techniques used by Scientologists. Based on this report, Victoria enacted a Psychological Practices Act in 1965, prohibiting the use of E-meters by unregistered persons and prohibiting
the practice or teaching of Scientology for payment (Scientology has not been illegal in Victoria
since the Act was amended in 1982).
Prior to the Act, Scientology operated as the Hubbard Association of Scientologists. In order
to avoid its provisions, the organization changed its name to the Church of the New Faith. Holding
themselves out as a church, the Scientologists contended that they were not within the provisions
of the Psychological Practices Act and that they were exempt from Victoria's payroll taxes as a
religious institution.
The claimed tax exemption resulted in litigation which examined two issues: first was Scientology in fact a religion; and second, may the exemption be denied because the church was organized
for the illegal purpose of avoiding the Psychological Practices statute. Both issues were resolved

against the Scientologists. SeeNote, Church of the New Faith v. Commissioner for Payroll Tax, 14
MEIB. U.L. REv. 318 (1983).
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tection clause of the fifth amendment and the free exercise clause of the first
amendment. 16 The hostility was evidenced by the special scrutiny it received
from IRS intelligence units. It was also exhibited in the IRS agents' derogatory
statements about Scientology during investigation of the church and by government counsels' statements during trial.
The Tax Court concluded that these facts did not establish that the IRS'
revocation of the church's exemption violated its right to equal protection.'"
Applying the standards used in criminal cases,'8 the court maintained that a
selective prosecution is unconstitutional only if (1) the decision to prosecute was
based on impermissible grounds such as race, religion or the exercise of constitutional rights, and (2) similarly situated persons are not generally prosecuted.
9
The court held that the church's argument failed both prongs of this test.
Notwithstanding evidence indicating IRS hostility to Scientology, the court
concluded the revocation was not motivated by religious or political animus but

16. 83 T.C. at 447. The denial of equal protection resulted from the selective enforcement
of the tax laws against an organization with unpopular religious views and practices. Free exercise
of religion was impaired because the revocation was motivated by the governmental officials' dislike
for the church's unorthodoxy. Id. at 448.
The church also maintained that matters concerning its exempt status were handled in an
arbitrary and capricious manner, being rushed through in a wholesale effort to eliminate the exempt
status of all Scientology churches. Shortly before the formal letter of revocation was issued, the
Justice Department requested an IRS review of the exempt status of several Scientology churches
including the Church of Scientology of California. The Justice Department was at that time preparing its defense in a refund litigation case in the Court of Claims against the Founding Church
of Scientology. Believing that the IRS' recognition of the exempt status of other Scientology churches
was inconsistent with its position in that case, the Justice Department asked the IRS to revoke
the exemptions of similar Scientology churches before the beginning of the trial.
The Tax Court held that the revocation was based upon the facts learned during an extensive
audit and not as part of a governmental plan to rush through revocations. Evidence for this was
found in the good faith negotiations with the church that preceded issuance of the revocation and
the fact that no other Scientology churches lost their exemptions during the period between Justice's
request and the trial. Id. at 451.
17. Id. at 452. Noting that selective enforcement is not in itself unconstitutional, the court
maintained that in some instances, particularly in tax cases, it may be a necessity. Id. at 448.
18. Id. However, in applying this standard the court noted: "Like the Ninth Circuit, which
has appellate jurisdiction of this case, we express our concern that examining the IRS' actions
here under the standard applied in criminal cases may be too stringent a test." Id. at 448. In
Karme v. Commissioner, 673 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit did not decide whether
a more lenient standard applied in civil cases because the taxpayers had failed to satisfy the more
stringent criminal standard.
19. 83 T.C. at 456. A similar two-part test is applied to selective enforcement claims in
nearly all circuits. It is based upon the Supreme Court's holding in Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,
456 (1962), that equal protection is violated where a selection for prosecution is "deliberately based
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification." Because of
the deference that the courts generally accord prosecutorial discretion, defendants have rarely been
successful in asserting this defense. See Note, Rethinking Selective Enforcement in the First Amendment
Context, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 144 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Note]; Note, United States
v. Wayte: Selective Prosecution and the Right to Dissent, 14 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 58 (1984); see also
Note, Passive Enforcement of Draft Registration: Does It Constitute Selective Prosecution in Violation of Equal
Protection Because It Discriminates Against Persons Based on Their Exercise of First Amendment Rights?, 57
TEMPLE L.Q. 671 (1984).
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by "legitimate agency concerns. "20 Characterizing the government's denigration
of Scientology's religious practices as "trial lawyer's hyperbole," the court noted
that some of the IRS' animosity toward the church may be attributed to the
church's efforts to "thwart [its] duty to administer the tax laws." ' 21 The church
also failed to demonstrate that the IRS had not revoked the exemptions of
similarly situated churches. 22 Citing to a list of revocation cases, the court
maintained that there was ample evidence of the IRS' vigorous enforcement
23
policy in this area.
The court's emphasis on the IRS' motive appears unduly narrow. The
government's motive for classifying an organization as a subversive or tax resister is not determinitive of whether the classification affords equal protection.
Equal protection means that the government may not treat similarly situated
persons in different ways. 24 Although the government may draw lines to determine which persons are in fact dissimilar, these classifications may not be
based upon arbitrary or constitutionally impermissible criteria.2 5 The legislature
may not place such criteria in the laws nor may an administrative agency use
them in the application of otherwise valid laws. 6
In most cases, the courts will defer to a legislative or administrative classification if there is a rational relationship between the line drawn and a legitimate governmental end. However, if the classification is based upon the
exercise of a fundamental right protected by the first amendment, the courts
will review it under a "strict scrutiny" standard. 27 This standard requires that
the government show that its interest is so overriding as to justify restricting
28
the right in question.
In the Church of Scientology decision, the alleged equal protection violation
was that the IRS mandated special treatment and scrutiny for unorthodox
churches. If such a policy had the effect of inhibiting unorthodox beliefs, then

20. 83 T.C. at 450. The court considered the IRS' actual treatment of the church's tax
status to be "flawless." The IRS' decision to revoke was found to be made after intensive audits
of the church's information returns and following good faith negotiations. Id. at 452.
21.
Id. at 453 (It would appear that a governmental action based upon an IRS desire to
"get even" would violate the improper motive prong of the selective enforcement test cited by the
court.).
22. Id. The court appears to have given little weight to the fact that the Church of Scientology
was selected for intensive investigation by IRS intelligence agents for political reasons. Thus, it
was targeted in a different manner and for different reasons than other churches noted by the
court. Id.
23. Id. at 453. The church sought to distinguish itself from these cases by characterizing itself
as the only "hierarchical church" to be selected. The court refused to make this distinction, holding
that the operative class is churches or religious organizations. The court noted that even if the
church could distinguish itself in this manner, an IRS decision to mount a test case would not
constitute discriminatory enforcement. Id.
24. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 582 (1978).
25. Id.
26. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
27. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); e.g., Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
28. See infra text and accompanying notes 32-48.
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the classification is certainly suspect. 29 This follows whether the policy is motivated by "legitimate agency concerns" or by hostility to unorthodox beliefs.- °
The government should be required to show that its monitoring of religious
organizations such as the Church of Scientology is justified. In effect, no real
distinction can be made between the first amendment and fifth amendment
protections in cases where a classification is based upon religious activities.3 1
B.

Violative of Free Exercise Clause

The Tax Court also reviewed the church's hostility argument under a direct
first amendment analysis. 32 However, it framed the issue in terms of equal
protection stating that "[tihe First Amendment, however, offers petitioner no
more protection than the Fifth Amendment. 13 3 Thus, the court minimized the
impact of an IRS policy that selected a church for intensive scrutiny on the
basis of its unpopular religious beliefs and practices. Additionally, even if the
IRS' actions were substantially motivated by unconstitutional conduct, the court
maintained the government may prevail by showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that the same determination would have been made without resorting
to impermissible considerations. 4
This holding relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Mt. Healthy City
Board of Education v. Doyle 35 In Mt, Healthy, an untenured teacher's revelation
of a school memorandum to a local radio station was found to be a "substantial
factor '" 6' behind the school board's decision not to rehire him, The Court held
that such a showing did not automatically require the teacher to be rehired,
Rather, it shifted the burden to the employer to establish, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the instructor would not have been rehired notwithstanding
consideration of the protected speech. 37 The Court reasoned that this test would

29.
The executive branch may not adopt a policy that would be unconstitutional if enacted
into a statute. In United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 19 8 3 ), the court held that
the government's policy of passively enforcing the draft registration requirements was an impermissible selective enforcement because it punished only those persons who spoke out against registration. But see United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983), vacated and remanded, 105
S. Ct. 1524 (1985),
30. But see Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457 UY.S. 853
(1982) (question of whether removal of books from school library violated students' first amendment
rights depended on motivation behind school board's action). See generally Columbia Note, supra
note 19.
31. In first amendment cases the courts must determine whether a compelling state interest
justifies an infringement of religious liberty. See e g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
32. 83 T.C. at 454,.

33.

d.

34. Id. The court concluded that a preponderance of the evidence showed that there were
valid statutory grounds for the revocation. Thus, any taint arising from IRS hostility was overcome.
35. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See also Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769 (11th
Cir, 1982); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
36. Mi. Healthy, 429 U.S, 274 at 283.
37. Id. at 287. In a subsequent case, Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439
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protect the employee's first amendment right to speak freely without placing
him in a better position than he would have occupied if he had not exercised
38
this right.
The Court's goal in Mt. Healthy was to protect the teacher's rights without
unnecessarily interfering in the school board's exercise of discretion in selecting
its teaching staff.3 9 Absent constitutional considerations, a school board need

not show a substantial reason for refusing to rehire an untenured teacher; such
teachers are not afforded most procedural due process protections.4 The Supreme Court was concerned that a "borderline or marginal" teacher might
prevent the board from assessing his performance by engaging in dramatic or
abrasive, yet constitutionally protected, conduct; 4' a particularly important consideration if the decision to rehire would accord tenure.4 2 The "but for" test
adopted in Mt. Healthy was intended to protect the interests of the school board
by allowing the board to show that the injury to the teacher, that is, the decision
4 3
not to rehire, was not caused by constitutionally impermissible considerations.
Assuming the Mt. Healthy criteria apply to the Church of Scientology situation,'
the government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
church's tax exemption would have been revoked even if the IRS was not
motivated by hostility to its religious practices.45 In concluding that the IRS

U.S. 410 (1979), the Court indicated that the lower courts must find that the employee would
have been rehired "but for" the protected conduct. Id. at 417. A somewhat different definition is
found in Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982),
where the Court held that a school board could not remove books from a school library if a
constitutionally impermissible intent was a "decisive factor" behind its decision. The Court defined
a "decisive factor" as "a 'substantial factor' in the absence of which the opposite decision would
have been reached." Id. at 871 n.22.
38. M. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285.
39. Id. at 287.
40. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Megill v. Board of Regents, 541 F.2d
1073 (1976). See also Eagle, First Ammdment Protection For Teachers Who Criticize Academic Policy: Biting
the Hand That Feeds You, 60 Cm.-KmTwr L. REv. 229, 235 (1984).
41. M. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285.
42. Id. at 286. The court noted that:
The long-term consequences of an award of tenure are of great moment both to the
employee and the employer. They are too significant for us to hold that the Board in this
case would be precluded, because it considered constitutionally protected conduct in deciding
not to rehire Doyle, from attempting to prove to the trier of fact that quite apart from
such conduct Doyle's record was such that he would not have been rehired in any event.
Id.
43. &e Wolly, What Hath Mt. Healthy Wrought, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 385 (1980).
44. It is, of course, questionable whether the two situations are sufficiently similar for the
Mt. Healthy test to apply at all. The relative weights of the interests of the government and the
parties are quite different. In M. Healthy, the school board's interest in controlling the selection
of its teachers was balanced against the rights of an untenured teacher, who, absent unconstitutional
conduct, had no claim to his position. In the Church of Scientology case, the government's stake is
protection of the tax system and the revenue base. However, the church's right of free exercise
does not first pass through any tenure period, during which the IRS is given broad discretion to
grant or not grant tax exemptions.
45. Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 448 (1984). Under the Mt. Healthy
test, the burden of proof shifts to the government only after it is established that unconstitutional
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had carried this burden of proof, the Tax Court relied upon the government's
showing that the church did not satisfy the statutory requirements for exemption
under section 501(c)(3).1 This proved that the result of the church's audit would
have been the same absent any IRS hostility towards its religion.
However, the church contended that unconstitutional conduct had motivated
the government's selection of the church for special scrutiny and audit. Thus,
the "but for" test of Mt. Healthy should require the IRS to show that its policies
would have resulted in that investigation in any event. The selection of a
taxpayer for audit involves different considerations than the review of a candidate for retention in a teaching position. Since the teacher's contract is subject
to renewal, the school board must annually review the records of all untenured
teachers. Although unconstitutional considerations may play a part in the retention decision, generally they are not involved in selecting who shall be reviewed.
Conversely, most taxpayers are not audited and most exempt organizations
are not subjected to rigorous examination of their financial affairs. This does
not mean that the selection of a taxpayer for audit must be random. It may
be based upon factors such as notoriety, deterrent effect on other taxpayers,
cost of prosecution and ease of identification.4 7 Had the IRS shown that these
factors were present in the Church of Scientology case, and that the audit and
investigation were likely in any event, the Mt. Healthy test would have been
satisfied.

4

s

IV.

CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF SECTION

501(c)(3)

A number of issues in Church of Scientology arise from the church's assertion

that the Internal Revenue Code provides unconstitutional criteria for determining the tax-exempt status of churches. Section 501(c)(3) of the Code describes an exempt religious entity as being "organized and operated exclusively
for religious .

.

. purposes, . . . no part of the net earnings of which inures to

the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." 4

9

In addition to these

considerations were a substantial factor motivating the government's actions. The Tax Court determined that the church had produced evidence to raise sufficient doubts about the constitutionality
of the IRS' conduct.
46. Id. at 454.
47. See Columbia Note, supra note 19, at 144.
48. An important case on selective enforcement in the tax exemption area predates Mt. Healthy.
In Center for Corporate Responsibility Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973), a district
court enjoined the IRS from denying an exemption to the plaintiff. The court found that the
organization in question met all the requirements for exemption but that it had been denied because
of direct political intervention by the White House and by political appointees in the IRS. The
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a number of White House files in camera
with respect to a claim of executive privilege. In denying that the documents were protected, the
court stated that they involved use of the IRS in a "selective and discriminatory fashion." Id.
49. I.R.C. S 501 (West 1985). Organizations that are exempt from taxation under I.R.C.
S 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code are described in S 501(c)(3) of the Code. Although these
organizations are ordinarily referred to as "charitable," $ 501(c)(3) describes the following as
qualified purposes: "religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
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express conditions for exemption, the Tax Court reads an implied "public
policy" condition into the statute requiring compliance with fundamental public
50
policy standards derived from the law of charitable trusts. The church maintained that both the express and implied conditions for exemption violate the
free exercise and establishment clauses of the first amendment.
A.

Taxation of "Religious Income"

The church contended that these statutory conditions were invalid because
the Constitution compels tax-exemption for income derived from and applied
to religious activities .5 ' The exemption of "religious income" is mandated by
both first amendment religion clauses in order to maintain governmental "neutrality" toward religion.5 2 Although the Supreme Court has ruled that the Constitution does not prohibit tax exemptions for churches, 53 there is no direct
authority that such exemptions are required. 4

purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition... or for the prevention
of cruelty to animals." See supra note 3 for definition of qualified purposes. Contributions to
organizations described in I.R.C. S 501(c)(3) may also be deductible by donors under I.R.C. S
170.
50. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). Although the BobJones decision
applied this public policy standard, it is questionable whether it is applicable to churches. The
Court stated in a footnote: "We deal here only with religious schools, - not with churches or
other purely religious institutions; here, the governmental interest is in denying public support to
racial discrimination in education." Id. at 2035 n.29 (emphasis in original). See infra text accompanying notes 125-41.
51. Church of Scientology. 83 T.C. at 456. Income derived from commercial activities unrelated
to a charitable organization's exempt purpose is taxable under the "unrelated business income"
provisions of I.R.C. §§ 511-513. The regulations state that a business is related, and therefore not
subject to tax, if "the conduct of the business activities has a causal relationship to the achievement
of exempt purposes." Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (West 1985). To be substantially related, the
business activities must "contribute importantly" to the accomplishment of these exempt purposes.
Id. The constitutional issue raised here concerns only such of the church's income that is earned
through activities substantially related to its religious purpose. Of course, one of the major issues
in this case is whether the church had a substantial commercial rather than religious purpose for
engaging in its profit-making activities. See infra text accompanying notes 103-13.
52. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), Chief Justice Burger used the term
"benevolent neutrality" to describe the course that the courts must steer "between the two Religion
Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical
extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Id. at 668-69. The term "neutrality" is again
referred to in the opinion as meaning that the government must adhere to a "policy of neutrality
that derives from an accommodation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses [that] has
prevented the kind of involvement that would tip the balance toward government control of churches
or governmental restraint on religious practice." Id. at 669-70.
53. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The Court held that the benefit conferred
on religion through the exemption of churches from property taxation does not violate the establishment clause. But cf.Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (distinguishing Walz and invalidating a program which provided tax benefits to parents of
children attending parochial schools).
54. 397 U.S. 664. The decision in Walz does not directly address this question. However,
the Chief Justice's majority opinion does give some indication of his view:
Either course, taxation of churches or exemption, occasions some degree of involvement
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The Tax Court rejected the church's contention that the first amendment
requires a tax exemption for religious income.5 5 In the court's view, the Constitution does not compel exemption of such income any more than it prohibits
the general economic regulation of the press.5 6 Indeed, the court maintained
that a compulsory exemption for religious income would violate the establishment clause in two ways. First, it would be a compulsory subsidy that advanced
religion. Second, it would necessitate an excessive government entanglement in
church affairs because the government would have to examine the religious or
secular nature of each item of income and expenditure.57
Although the Tax Court concluded an exemption for religious income would
impermissibly subsidize religion, the Supreme Court has never directly addressed
this question. The Court has determined that the establishment clause does not
prohibit churches from being included in a broad class of tax-exempt organizations.5" Thus, the inquiry is limited to exemptions that are specifically applicable to religions. There are two basic issues involved: first, whether religious
tax exemptions are in fact subsidies; and second, whether this kind of support
for religious activities is constitutionally impermissible.
The most relevant case for analyzing these issues is Walz v. Tax Commission 9
where the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute exempting houses of
religious worship from taxation. In determining whether the statute violated the
establishment clause, the Court applied a three part test.60 To be valid, a statute
(1) must have a secular purpose, (2) must not have a primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion and (3) must not result in excessive entanglement of

with religion. Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and
the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes.
Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indirect economic
benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser, involvement than taxing them.
Id. at 674-75.
55. 83 T.C. at 458. Before addressing the constitutional questions, the- court discussed the
appropriate standard of review to be applied to issues involving the taxability of activities protected
by the first amendment. The court stated that a strict scrutiny standard applies only where the
church can show that the statute in question endangers one of its "fundamental rights" under the
free exercise clause. Where this is not shown, the court will apply a lesser standard, measuring
the statute by its "reasonableness." Concluding that there is no fundamental constitutional right
to tax-exempt religious income, the court applied the reasonableness standard. Id. at 456.
56. Id. at 458.
57. Id.
58. E.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (state tax deduction for public and private
school expenses); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax exemptions provided
for a broad class of charitable orgainzations included houses of religious worship); Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (state loan of secular textbooks to all children); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (state reimbursement to all parents for expenses incurred in transportating children to school).
59. 397 U.S. 664.
60. Although this three prong test was more clearly enunciated in the subsequent case of
Lemon v. Kurzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), it had in fact completely evolved first in Waz. Set
Cornelius, Church and State - The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall of Separation or Benign
Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1984).
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government in religion. Because the statute exempted a broad range of organizations, it was found to have a secular purpose. 6 After examining the long
history of federal and state tax exemptions for religious organizations, the Court
concluded that their effect was a "kind of benevolent neutrality" to churches
rather than an impermissible aid to religion.62
In analyzing the third part of the test, the Court maintained that both
taxing and exempting churches involves government "entanglement" in religious affairs.63 However, eliminating the exemption increases involvement by
requiring valuation of church property and a variety of legal proceedings such
as tax liens and foreclosures. 64 Allowing the exemption gives religion an "indirect economic benefit" but results in fewer other forms of involvement., 5 The
proper analysis, the Court indicated, is to determine which alternative results
66
in a lesser degree of entanglement.
The Court was unequivocal in holding that a church tax exemption does
not create an impermissible entanglement with religion, nor does it constitute
a subsidy for religion. The opinion indicates that a "direct money subsidy" is
the kind of relationship likely to result in excessive government involvement
because a close administrative relationship is required to enforce statutory and
administrative standards.67 However, the grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship of religion because "the government does not transfer part of its revenue
to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the
state.' '68
Despite this language, a recent Supreme Court decision has raised the question of whether the Court will continue to distinguish religious tax exemptions

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

397 U.S. at 672-73.
Id. at 676-80.
Id. at 674.
Id.
Id.

66. Id. at 675, where the Court stated: "In analyzing either alternative the questions are
whether the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and
continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement."
67. Id. An interesting comment on the question of what constitutes an administrative entanglement is found in Schachner, Religion and the Public Treasury After Taxation With Representation
of Washington, Mueller and Bob .Jones, 1984 UTAH L. REv. 275, 287-90 (author discusses the
considerable administrative supervision required under I.R.C. S 107 with respect to the clergy's
income tax exemption for the rental value of residences provided as compensation).
68. 397 U.S. at 675. Similar language appears in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion:
Tax exemptions and general subsidies... are qualitatively different. Though both provide economic assistance, they do so in fundamentally different ways. A subsidy involves
the direct transfer of public monies to the subsidized enterprise and uses resources exacted
from taxpayers as a whole. An exemption, on the other hand, involves no such transfer.
Id. at 690 (citation omitted). This language and ChiefJustice Burger's majority opinion appear to
have been influenced by the economic analysis of church tax exemptions in Professor Bittker's
article, Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969).
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion does not adopt the idea that exemptions are economically
different from subsidies. However, he agrees that subsidies necessitate more governmental involvement in religion. He leaves open the question of whether direct subsidies would violate the establishment clause. 397 U.S. at 699.
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from direct subsidies. In Regan v. Taxation With Representation69 a public interest
group challenged the constitutionality of the portion of section 501(c)(3) that
70
denies tax exemptions to organizations engaged in lobbying. The court held
that the first amendment does not require that Congress subsidize lobbying
activities. The rationale underlying its conclusion was that a tax exemption is
equivalent to a subsidy.7'
The Court tempered this conclusion somewhat by a footnote which maintained that although exemptions and cash subsidies are similar, they are not
identical in all respects.7 2 The footnote refers to portions of the majority and
concurring opinions in Walz which maintain that church tax exemptions are
not subsidies for religion and that exempting churches from taxation results in
less government entanglement with religion than would taxation." However,
the Court apparently no longer accepts the economic distinction between exemptions and subsidies made in Walz. 74 Since it is unlikely the Court intends

69. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
70. I.R.C. S 501(c)(3) (West 1985). In pertinent part S 501(c)(3) provides exemptions for
described organizations "no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda,
The group in question claimed that this
or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation ....
prohibition on lobbying violated the first amendment by imposing an "unconstitutional condition"
on its receiving tax exempt and tax deductible status.
71. 461 U.S. at 544.
Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered through
the tax system. A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income. Deductible contributions
are similar to cash grants of the amount of a portion of the individual's contribution.
Id. In Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), the Court
found a similar equivalence between tax deductions and subsidies. Id. at 793. The Court struck
down a New York statute that provided tax deductions for parents of children in private schools.
The Court stated: "The only difference [between parents receiving a tax deduction and those
receiving a tuition grant] is that one parent receives an actual cash payment while the other is
allowed to reduce.. .the sum he would otherwise be obliged to pay over to the State." Id. at 791.
But see Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983), where the Court suggested that tax deductions
may be a form of quid pro quo, whereby the state foregoes taxation in return for some of the
benefits and lower costs attributable to the services performed by charitable organizations. Id. at
3070.
72. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 103 S.Ct 1997, 2000 n.5 (1983). In stating that
exemptions and deductions, on the one hand, are like cash subsidies, on the other, we of course
do not mean to assert that they are in all respects identical. 461 U.S. 544.
73. The footnote gives the following citation to Wa~z: Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U:S. 664,
674-676 (1970); id. at 690-91 (Brennan J., concurring); id., at 699 (opinion of Harlan, J.).
74. No clear economic rationale for not taxing churches has been articulated. One view is
that the exemption is necessary because it is not possible to define the taxable income of nonprofit
organizations in a meaningful way. Donations are not really equivalent to income, but are more
in the nature of gifts. Expenditures for charitable purposes are not really equivalent to business
expenses. Se Bittker & Radhert, The Exemption of Nonprofit OrganizationsFrom Federal Income Taxation,
85 YA.E LJ. 299 (1976); Bittker, supra note 68. Another position is that it is economically efficient
to allow the exemption for organizations whose services are not more efficiently provided by profitoriented entities. Under this approach, the cases that have denied exemptions to organizations
because of "commercial purposes" are justified where the charity engaged in commercial activity
that produced, distributed or sold goods and services that are also provided by profit-seeking
businesses. Since the profit-seeking business will generally operate more efficiently, there is no
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to overrule Walz and begin taxing the churches, eliminating the distinction
between exemptions and subsidies may make it possible for the government to
provide more direct forms of economic assistance to religious organizations."
A direct subsidy could be permissible if it would not result in more governmental
administrative and supervisory entanglement than would a tax exemption. 6
B.
1.

Free Exercise Issues

Background -

The "Purposes"

Test

The issues concerning the free exercise clause involve the Tax Court's application of the "religious purposes" test in section 501(c)(3). The statute requires that an exempt entity be organized and operated exclusively for exempt
purposes. This has been construed to mean that an exempt organization's ac7
tivities may not be motivated by a substantial commercial purpose.1 Where a
nonexempt purpose is not one of the organization's stated goals, it has been
inferred from the nature of its activities.78 In a number of cases, a commercial
purpose has been inferred from the business-like manner in which the charity
79
operated.

economic reason to grant tax exemptions. This would not apply then, to churches, whose religious
services are not competitive with business. See Hansmann, The Rationale For Exempting Nonprofit
Organizations From Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54 (1981).
75. Possibly the Court will use the entanglement test in a more restrictive manner, allowing
an exemption only if it results in a lesser degree of entanglement than would taxation of the
religious organization. See Schachner, supra note 67, at 285.
76. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Walz may presage this approach. Harlan maintained that exemptions and subsidies do not differ as an economic matter. However, he went on
to state:
Whether direct aid or subsidies entail that degree of involvement that is prohibited by
the Constitution is a question that must be reserved for a later case upon a record that
fully develops all the pertinent considerations such as the significance and character of
subsidies in our political system and the role of the government in administering the subsidy
in relation to the particular program aided. It may be that the States, while bound to
observe strict neutrality, should be freer to experiment with involvement - on a neutral
basis - than the Federal Government.
397 U.S. at 699 (citation omitted).
77. Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945). The Court held that one of
the organization's stated purposes, the improvement of business methods among merchants, was
not an exempt purpose. Since this purpose was substantial, no exemption from Social Security
taxes was allowed. Id.
78. Fides Pub. Assn. v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ind. 1967); Scripture Press
Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961); B.S.W. Group v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.
352 (1978): Presbyterian & Reformed Pub. Co. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1070 (1982), rev'd, 842 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) j 9764.
79. The test was stated by the Tax Court in B.S.W. Group v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 352
(1978) as follows:
The fact that [an] activity may constitute a trade or business does not, of itself, disqualify
it from classification under Section 501(c)(3), provided the activity furthers or accomplishes
an exempt purpose. Rather, the critical inquiry is whether [the] primary purpose... is an
exempt purpose, or whether [the] primary purpose is the nonexempt one of operating a
commercial business producing net profits. This is a question of fact to be resolved on
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The IRS originally defined the statutory requirement that an organization
be organized and operated for exclusively charitable purposes to mean that
8°
exempt organizations could not engage in any business activities. The Supreme
Court rejected this narrow construction, holding that the conduct of profitable
business activities does not constitute a nonexempt purpose where the business
income is used to further exempt purposes. 81 The "destination" rather than
the source of income was held to be the proper test because Congress had not
intended to prevent tax-exempt organizations from generating income to support
their charitable activities.82
This "destination" test was criticized as allowing an unfair competitive advantage to businesses owned by exempt organizations.8 3 To prevent commercial

the basis of all the evidence .... Factors such as the particular manner in which the organizations' activities are conducted, the commercial hue of those activities, and the existence and amount of annual or accumulated profits are relevant evidence of a forbidden
predominant purpose.
Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
Although this case refers to the organization's primary purpose, subsequent cases have held
that the exemption is lost where the organization's commercial purpose is "substantial." Fides Pub.
Ass'n v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 924, 935 (N.D. Ind. 1967).
80. See O.D. 953, 1921-4 C.B. 261-62. This definition is not in accord with the legislative
history of $ 501(cX3). Senator Bacon, the sponsor in 1909 of the bill containing the statute's present
wording, clearly indicated his intention that profit-making activities would be permitted: "The
corporation which I had particularly in mind... is a large printing establishment.. .in which there
must necessarily be profit made, and there is a profit made exclusively for religious, benevolent,
" 44 Costa. REc., pt. 4. at 4151 (1909).
charitable, and educational purposes ..
81. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578 (1924). This view is reflected in the Treasury
Regulations adopted in 1960, which state:
An organization may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3) although it operates
a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities, if the operation of such trade or'
business is in furtherance of the organization's exempt purpose or purposes and if the
organization is not organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an
unrelated trade or business, as defined in section 513.
Treas. Reg. $ 1.501(cX3)-1(e)(1) (1960).
82. Id. at 581. See Note, Profitable Related Business Activities and Charitable Exemption Under Section
501(cX3), 44 Gao. WAsh. L. Rxv. 270 (1976).
83. The House Ways and Means Committee Report on the Revenue Act of 1950, H.R.
REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950) states:
.[section 501(cX3)] organizations enables them to use their
The tax-free status of ..
profits tax-free to expand operations, while their competitors can expand only with the
profits remaining after taxes. Also, a number of examples have arisen where these organizations have, in effect, used their tax exemption to buy an ordinary business. That
is, they have acquired the business with no investment on their own part and paid for it
in installments out of subsequent earnings - a procedure which usually could not be
followed if the business were taxable.
Id. at 36-37. This concern was reiterated during congressional consideration of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976. The Senate Finance Committee stated that the major purpose for the taxation of
unrelated business income is "to make certain that an exempt organization does not commercially
exploit its exempt status for the purpose of unfairly competing with taxpaying organizations." S.
REP. No. 938, 94th Cbng., 2d Sess. 601 (1976).
One case that achieved a great deal of notoriety involved a macaroni company owned by an
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exploitation of tax-exempt status, the Revenue Act of 1950 imposed a tax on
an exempt organization's "unrelated business income."" 4 This is defined as
income derived from the conduct of a trade or business that is not substantially
related to the exercise or performance of an organization's exempt purpose or
function.15 The legislative history indicates, however, that the unrelated business
income tax was not intended to restrict an organization's ability to make profits
through its charitable activities even when earned in direct competition with
taxable businesses.8 6 Nor was the tax intended to affect in any way the exempt
status of an otherwise qualified organization.87
Notwithstanding this legislative history, a number of otherwise qualified organizations have lost their tax exemptions because their exempt activities generated profits."" In these situations, the presence of a substantial commercial
purpose was inferred from the business-like manner in which the charity operated.

9

As the Tax Court described the analysis: "If

...

an organization's

management decisions replicate those of commercial enterprises, it is a fair
inference that at least one purpose is commercial, and hence nonexempt."9"
The factor most likely to indicate a commercial purpose appears to be the
presence of substantial profits. 9'
Determining the existence of an unstated commercial purpose by scrutinizing
business-like practices and profitability favors poorly managed and less efficient
religious organizations. In Golden Rule Church Association v. Commissioner,'

the

Tax Court upheld the exempt status of a religious group that operated sawmills,
a chain of laundries, a hotel and a tree nursery in order to illustrate to the
exempt university. C.F. Mueller v. Commissioner, 190 F. 2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1951). See Note, The
Macaroni Monopoly: The Developing Concept of Unrelated Business Income of Exempt Organizations, 81 HARV.
L. REv. 1280 (1968).
84. The Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, §§ 421-422, 64 Stat. 909, 948-50 (1950) enacted the
predecessors of what are now I.R.C. SS 511-513. Section 511(a)(1) imposes the tax at corporate
rates under I.R.C. 5 11, except that charitable trusts are taxable at the estates and trusts rates
under I.R.C. S l(e). I.R.C. S 511(b)(1).
85. I.R.C. § 513.
86. See Desiderio, The Profitable Nonprofit Corporation: Business Activity and Tax Exemption Under
Section 501(cX3) of LR.C., 1 N.M.L. REv. 563, 570 (1971); B. HOPKINs, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS § 40.1 (4th ed. 1983).
87. The Senate Report makes this clear:
The bill does not deny the exemption where the organizations are carrying on unrelated
active business enterprises, nor require that they dispose of such businesses. . . . [These]
provisions merely impose the same tax on income derived from an unrelated trade or
business as is borne by their competitors. In fact it is not intended that the tax imposed
on unrelated business income vill have any effect on the tax-exempt status of any organization.
S. REP. No.. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1950).
88. A number of cases and IRS rulings have revoked the tax-exempt status of otherwise
qualified organizations whose exempt activities have generated profits. See Zelenak, Serving Two Masters: Commercial Hues and Tax Exempt Organizations, 8 PUGET SOUND L. REv. 1 (1984).
89. See supra note 79.
90. Presbyterian & Reformed Pub. Co. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1070 (1982), rev'd, 743
F.2d 148 (3rd Cir. 1984).
91. Id. at 155.
92. 41 T.C. 719 (1964).
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public that the "golden rule" is not incompatible with business. In reaching
its conclusion, the court maintained that the organization's "consistent nonprofitability" evidenced the absence of a commercial purpose for its business
activities.9" Because of this holding, the court did not address the contention
that the first amendment barred treating business activities as a nonreligious
94
purpose when they are engaged in to conform with a religious doctrine.
The view that an organization's profitability indicates a nonexempt commercial purpose was recently rejected by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
in Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Co. v. Commissioner." In reversing the Tax
Court, the appellate court noted that neither section 501(c)(3) nor its legislative
history define an organization's purpose as a derivitive of the volume of its
business activities. 96 The court maintained that since the regulations and case
law do not provide a clear definition of "purpose," determining it by reference
to accumulation of profits results in arbitrary and ad hoc decisionmaking. 97 The
proper inquiry, according to the court, is to determine the purpose to which
an organization's business activity is directed.9 8
A sirriilar approach was adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Bethel Conservative
Mennonite Church v. Commissioner." The court maintained that the crucial inquiry
is not into the nature of an organization's activity, but into the purpose the
activity accomplishes.' °0 The Tax Court revoked the church's exemption because
a large portion of its disbursements and receipts were for the payment of medical
expenses under a church-sponsored medical plan. The Tax Court held the
operation of the plan constituted a substantial nonexempt purpose.10 The appellate court reversed, determining that the medical plan served the church's
exempt purpose by furthering the belief that church members should pool their
resources and bear each other's burdens.' 2

93. Id. at 731.
94. Id. at 729-30.
95. Presbyterian & Reformed Pub. Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148 (3rd Cir. 1984),
rev'g 79 T.C. 1070 (1982). The Tax Court had upheld the IRS' revocation of the exemption of
a publisher of religious books. The Tax Court maintained that the publisher's substantial profits
and accumulated earnings in recent years had changed the corporation's purpose from charitable
to commercial.
96. Id. at 156.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 746 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984), revog 80 T.C. 352 (1983).
100. Id. at 391.
101. 80 T.C. 352 (1983).
102. 746 F.3d at 391-92. The Tax Court had concluded that a plan which benefits all contributing members of a religious congregation rather than only "needy" members does not further
a religious or other exempt purpose. 80 T.C. at 360 (1983). The appellate court maintained it
was an error for a court to define "needy" in strictly financial terms when the Mennonite faith
considers all of its members to be needy and deserving of assistance regardless of financial status.
The court pointed out that: "Religions by their very nature provide many services that benefit
only the members of the individual congregation, and to say that any church which so provides
these benefits must be denied tax exemptions would disrupt many organized churches as we know
them." 746 F.2d at 391.
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2.

The Right to Earn Profits

The Tax Court's inference that the Church of Scientology was animated by
a substantial commercial purpose was based on two factors: (1) the profitoriented manner in which the church promoted, priced and sold its religious
services and products,"'3 and (2) the church's substantial cash reserves and
annual profits.10 4 The church contended that this application of the section
501(c)(3) purposes test unconstitutionally restricted profit-making activities that
furthered religious beliefs.1 15 The limitation directly conflicted with the church's
practice of its belief in the doctrine of "exchange," which requires the church
to charge fees for religious services and literature."' 6
The court conceded that the commercial purpose test of section 501(c)(3)
conflicted with this religious practice, thereby restricting a fundamental right
protected by the free exercise clause.10 7 Such restrictions are subject to strict
judicial scrutiny, requiring the government to justify them as being "essential
to accomplish an overriding governmental interest."' However, citing the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Lee"°9 as controlling, the court concluded that the Treasury has such an overriding interest in maintaining its
revenue base. In Lee, the Court held that an employer's religious beliefs did
not exempt him from paying social security taxes on behalf of his employees." 0
Although payment of the tax conflicts with the Amish belief that participation
in insurance programs is sinful, the Court concluded that the employer's free
exercise right could not be accommodated without opening the door to a variety
of beliefs seeking similar exemptions."
It is difficult to understand the Tax Court's conclusion that the holding in
Lee controlled in the Church of Scientology case since the government's interest

103. Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, at 477 (1985) (the court was
particularly impressed by the commercial manner in which these religious services and products
were promoted, priced and contracted for).
104. Id. at 480.
105. Id. at 456.
106. Id. at 459. The church also asserted that it was necessary for it to engage in commercial
activities in order to sell its literature, advertise, accumulate earnings for future needs and to
remunerate its founder. The court rejected this contention, holding that the first amendment only
applies to church-sponsored activities that further a religious mission or purpose. Since purely
commercial ventures are not covered, an exemption may be revoked where commercial activities
take on a life of their own and assume "an independent importance and purpose." Id.
107. Id. at 460. The court stated that the fact that five of the Church of Scientology's branches
earned between 73 and 100 percent of their incomes from the sale of religious items and services
measurably contributed to its conclusion that the church had a substantial commercial purpose. Id.
108. Id. The court quotes this language from the Supreme Court's holding in Bob jones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603 (1983), which in turn was quoting its language in United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982).
109. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
110. Under I.R.C. 5 14 02(g) (1982), self-employed persons may claim a religious exemption
from participation in the social security and unemployment insurance systems. However, this exemption does not apply to persons who employ others.
111. 455 U.S. at 260. The Court's decision was motivated by its concern for the income tax
system rather than the social security system. It noted, however, that "[there is no principled
way.. .to distinguish between general taxes and those imposed under the Social Security Act." Id.
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in the two situations is clearly different. In Lee, the Supreme Court declined
to exempt an individual from a broadly applied tax because the exemption
would compromise the integrity of the entire tax system. The Court's concern
is clearly stated: "The tax system could not function if denominations were
allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a
manner that violates their religious belief. 112 The Church of Scientology, however, was not seeking an exemption because of a religious concern about the
government's use' of tax dollars It was the government, rather, that revoked
the exempt status of an organization because of the nature of its activities. The
government's narrow interest here is limited to the taxability of profits derived
from religious activities."'
V.

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The Church of Scientology contended that construing section 501(c)(3) to
restrict commercial activities which further a religious purpose was a limitation
which violated the first amendment establishment clause." 4 To satisfy the requirements of this clause, a statute (1) must have a secular purpose, (2) must
neither advance nor inhibit religion and (3) must not foster excessive government
entanglement with religion. 15 The church claimed that such a limitation inhibited newer religions that must rely on commercial techniques to gain adherents and propagate their faiths, while advancing older, more established
religions. Additionally the limitation results in excessive government entanglement with religion by necessitating intensive investigations and audits that question the religiosity of church policies and practices.
The court maintained that the fact that the statute restrictions on commercial
activity may have a harsher impact on newer religions does not, by itself,
impermissibly inhibit or advance religion. A statute may have disparate effects
116
on religious organizations if these effects result from neutral, secular criteria.
112. Id. It appears that the Court's concern for the integrity of the tax system arises in part.
from arguments made by many conscientious objectors and tax protesters. The Court illustrates
the problems it foresees as follows: "If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin,
and if a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities,
such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of
the income tax." Id. See also Note, Supreme Court Decisions in Taxation. 1981 Term, 36 TAx LAw.
421 (1983).
113. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court held that the free exercise clause
required that Amish children be exempted from the state's compulsory education laws. In balancing
the competing claims, the Court maintained that the state's interest was not of sufficient magnitude
to override the first amendment right. Id. Applying a similar test to the claims of the government
and church in the Scientology situation appears more approriate than a blanket assertion that the
government's interest in the tax system is always paramount.
114. Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 459 (1985).
115. Lemon v. Kurzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970).
116. 83 T.C. at 461. The court cites Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (f971) as authority
for this proposition. It seems more strongly supported by the Supreme Court's recent holding in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S Ct. 1355 (1984), which permitted the display of a nativity scene on
public property. The Court indicated that the display had the proper secular aim of showing the
historical origins of Christmas. 104 S. Ct. at 1363.
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In the court's view, the commercial purpose test is based upon the neutral
requirements of charitable trust law that charitable organizations serve public
goals rather than private interests. 7
The Tax Court's view that a statute may have a disparate impact on religions yet still be neutral is illustrated in Graham v. Commissioner," 8 which concerned the deductibility of contributions to the Church of Scientology. The court
denied the deductions, holding that payments to the church did not qualify as
charitable contributions because they were made in exchange for and in expectation of auditing services. "" The taxpayer argued that this construction of
section 170 (which allows the deduction for charitable contributions) violated
the requirement for neutrality through its particular impact on activities associated with Scientology.
20
The taxpayer relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Larson v. Valente.'
The Court in Larson struck down a Minnesota statute that imposed registration
and reporting requirements on religious organizations, because the law had a
substantially greater impact on certain religions. The Tax Court, however, distinguished the statute at issue in Larson from section 170, maintaining that
enactment of the Minnesota law was motivated by a legislative attempt to
discriminate against particular religious organizations. '2 ' The legislative history
of section 170, however, indicates no discriminatory motive and the statute does
not classify religions in any way.
The court also maintained that section 170 differs from the statute in Larson
because it "bears equally upon all religious organizations.' ' 22 Of course, the
gist of the taxpayer's contention in Graham was that denying a charitable contribution deduction because the donor receives certain types of religious services
does not bear equally on all religions. 23 It is possible to read Larson in this
vein, that is, as striking the statute because the state had not shown that the
disparate treatment afforded various religious groups was justified by an overriding state interest. 24 However, the Tax Court refused to interpret Larson
in this manner.

117.
118.

83 T.C. at 461.
83 T.C. 575 (1984).

119. 83 T.C. at 580-81. The courts have construed the term "charitable contribution" in the
Internal Revenue Code to be synonymous with the term gift. Dejong v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.
896, 899 (1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 373 (1962). Since a gift is a voluntary transfer without consideration,
a payment made in expectation of an anticipated benefit does not qualify. 36 T.C. at 899.
120. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
121. 83 T.C. at 583.
122. Id.
123. This holding may be contrasted with the Seventh Circuit's statement in Bethel Conservative Mennonite Church v. Commissioner, 746 F.2d 388, (7th Cir. 1984), where the court
pointed out that: "Religions by their very nature provide many sevices that benefit only the
members of the individual congregation, and to say that any church which so provides these benefits
must be denied tax exemption would disrupt many organized churches as we know them." Id. at
391.
124. See Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution,
72 CALIF. L. REv. 847, 893 (1984).
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THE PUBLIC POLICY ISSUE

A significant basis for the court's decision in Church of Scientology was that
25
the church violated the public policy standard implied in section 501(c)(3).
Based upon its reading of the Supreme Court's holding in Bob Jones University
v. United States, 126 the court held that section 501(c)(3) incorporates the law of
charitable trusts. Accordingly, the law requires that charitable organizations,
including churches, may be exempted from taxation only if they "serve a valid
public purpose and confer a public benefit."' 127 The court concluded that the
church did not satisfy this charitable trust - public policy standard because its
real purpose was not to advance religious beliefs but rather to make money
128
through a criminal conspiracy to defraud the government. In Bob Jones, the Supreme Court upheld the IRS' revocation of a religious
school's tax exemption on the basis of its racially discriminatory admissions
policy. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion maintained that the general
legislative framework and congressional intent behind section 501(c)(3) clearly
demonstrates that "entitlement to tax exemption depends upon meeting certain
common-law standards of charity.' ' 29 The form and history of the exemption
statute indicates that Congress intended that the common law of charitable trusts
would apply.' Pursuant to this common law, a charitable trust may not have
purposes that. are illegal or "contrary to established public policy."'' 3
The Court recognized that determining public policy and public benefit are
difficult and sensitive tasks. Therefore, to limit administrative discretion in making these determinations, the Court stated that an organization can be considered not to be charitable only where there is "no doubt that the activity involved
is contrary to a fundamental public policy.'

2 2

Upon review of the legislation,

executive orders and court decisions during the past twenty-five years, the Court
concluded there is no doubt that "racial discrimination in education" violates
such a fundamental policy.'
The Tax Court's use of this public policy test in the Church of Scientology
context raises two important questions. First, does the Bob Jones decision indicate
that the public policy standard for educational institutions is also applicable to
churches? Second, if this issue was not addressed in Bob Jones, is it constitu-

125. 83 T.C. at 502. In a pretrial ruling (which preceded the Supreme Court's holding on
this issue in Bob Jones University v. United States), the court stated that an organization seeking
exemption must satisfy the statute's express religious purpose and inurement conditions and also
"comply with fundamental notions of public policy." Id.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

461 U.S. 574 (1983).
83 T.C. at 502.
Id. at 504.
461 U.S. at 586.
Id. at 588 n.12.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 592.
Id.
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tionally permissible to condition a church's tax exemption upon conformance
with governmental pronouncements on public policy?13
A.

Applicability of Bob Jones to Churches

The Church of Scientology contended that the Bob Jones Court had expressly
reserved decision on whether the public policy standard implied in section
501(c)(3) applied to churches. This argument appears to be based upon a footnote in the opinion stating that the Court was dealing with "religious schools
not with churches or other purely religious institutions."'3 5 However, as the
Tax Court pointed out, 16 this footnote refers not to the public policy test but

to the portion of the decision concerning the University's claim that denying
its exemption impermissibly interferes with the exercise of religious beliefs. Having concluded that the government's overriding interest in eliminating racial
discrimination in education justified the first amendment infringement, the Bob
Jones Court noted that it was not ruling that this interest would justify interference in all religious activities.
Notwithstanding this context, it is possible to read this footnote as meaning
that the Court was also reserving judgment as to the applicability of the public
policy test to purely religious organizations. The text of the note is:
We deal here only with religious schools - not with churches or other
purely religious institutions; here the government's interest is in denying
public support to racial discrimination in education. As noted earlier,
racially discriminatory schools "exer[t] a pervasive influence on the entire
educational process," outweighing any public benefit that they might

134. If a public policy test is permissible, the question would arise as to the appropriate criteria
for determining whether a church's activities are contrary to fundamental public policy. A corollary
would be who should decide these criteria. These difficulties with the public policy test animated
Justice Powell to write a separate, concurring opinion in Bob Jones. Justice Powell stated: "I am
unwilling to join any suggestion that the Internal Revenue Service is invested with authority to
decide which public policies are sufficiently fundamental to require denials of tax exemptions. Its

business is to administer laws designed to produce revenue for the Government, not to promote
public policy." Id. at 611.
The concurring opinion also expresses concern about the dangers of selective enforcement that
would arise by permitting the IRS to establish public policy. Justice Powell quotes Justice Blackmun's dissent in Commissioner v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 774-75 (1974):
[Wihere the philanthropic organization is concerned, there appears to be little to circumscribe the almost unfettered power of the Commissioner. This may be very well so
long as one subscribes to the particular brand of social policy the Commissioner happens
to be advocating at the time... , but application of our tax laws should not operate in
so fickle a fashion. Surely, social policy in the first instance is a matter for legislative
concern.

461 U.S. at 611-12.
For cases where IRS selection was based upon the political or controversial nature of an organization, see Note, The Revocation of Tax Exemptions, and Tax Deductions For Donations to 501(cX3)
Organizations on Statutory and Constitutional Grounds, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 156, at 172 (1982).
135. 461 U.S. at 604 n.29 (emphasis in original).
136. Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 503 n.74 (1985).
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otherwise provide, Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 ....
generally Simon 495-96.1 31

See

Since the reference to Norwood appears in connection with the public policy
test, it may be seen as referring to the entire decision rather than to a part.
This view is reinforced by the Court's later reference to this footnote when
considering the final issue of the proper application of the public policy requirement of section 501(c)(3).' 5
More importantly, the Court refers to the Simon article, The Tax Exempt
Status of Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools.'39 In the section cited by the court
Ms. Simon discusses the application of the public purpose test to religious
organizations, not the free exercise question. 14° Indeed, Ms. Simon concludes
that the public benefit requirement of the charitable trust law is not applicable
to organizations engaged in purely religious activities,14 1 Taken as a whole, the
footnote suggests the Court intended to reserve its judgment on both the public
policy and first amendment issues with respect to racially discriminatory churches.
B.

Application of a Public Policy Requirement to Churches

The Tax Court in Church of Scientology maintained that although Bob Jones
did not address the issue, it is not unconstitutional to apply the public policy
requirements to church tax exemptions.14 2 In support of this view, the court
cited a number of free exercise cases where compelling governmental interests
were found to justify substantial restrictions on religious liberty.14 From these

137.
138.

461 U.S. at 609 n.29.
461 U.S. at 605 n.32. This note states:
Bob Jones University also argues that the IRS policy should not apply to it because
it is entitled to exemption under S 501(c)(3) as a "religious" organization, rather than as
an "educational" institution. The record in this case leaves no doubt, however, that Bob
Jones University is both an educational institution and a religious institution. As discussed
previously, the IRS policy properly extends to all private schools, includirng religious schools.
The IRS policy thus was properly applied to Bob Jones University.
Id. (citation omitted).
139. Simon, 7Ve Tax Exempt Status of Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 36 TAx L. REv.
477 (1981).
140. Id. at 495, where the article sets forth the following excerpt from a treatise on the law
of trusts:
Where the purpose of the trust is not the promotion of religion but merely the promotion
of purposes which are of a character beneficial to the community, it is obvious that a
distinction must be drawn between what may rationally be thought to be beneficial to the
community and what is dearly absurd. Where the purpose is to promote a particular
religion, however, it is almost impossible to draw such a line.
4 A. Sco'rr, THE LAw op TRusTS S 371.4 (1939).
141. Simon, supra note 139, at 495. The author states, "Thus, even if a church discriminates
in who may join its congregation, it is not at all clear that the church would be denied exemption
as a charitable organization. Indeed, it is likely that such a church would maintain its exemption,"
Id.
142. 83 T.C. at 503 n.74. The court stated: "In any event, we believe that the application
of public policy requirements to churches does not in and of itself offend the Constitution." Id.
143. Id. The court made particular reference to Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of
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cases, the court reasoned: "If the government has the power to prohibit religious
practices outright which interfere with fundamental public interests,. . .then, a
fortiori, it has the power
to deny tax benefits to churches which espouse and
1 44
practice such beliefs."

The court misread the cited cases. The cases did not hold that the religious
practices involved were restricted because they contravened public policies. These
limitations were not based on public policy but rather upon the government's
showing that governmental interests were paramount and could not accommodate the religious practices.'45 For example, in United States v. Lee,'46 a case
cited by the court, the employer was required to make social security contributions because that system must be comprehensive to be effective. The employer's request for exemption from payment of social security taxes was denied
because it could not be accommodated, not because the Amish belief interfered
with fundamental public interests. 1 4 The Court's reliance upon governmental
interests rather than contravention of public policies is also evident in Wisconsin
v. Yoder.' 48 The Court concluded in Yoder that the government's interest in
enforcing its compulsory education laws did not justify requiring Amish children
to attend schools in violation of their parents' religious beliefs. Certainly such
compulsory education laws represent a fundamental public policy.
The Tax Court's analysis also mistakenly equates the constitutional requirement that overriding governmental interests justify limiting first amendment
freedoms, with the trust law requirement that charitable organizations provide
public benefits. The different effects of these standards may be illustrated in
the racial discrimination context of Bob Jones. There the Court clearly established
the presence of a fundamental public policy to eradicate discrimination in many
aspects of American life.' 4 9 While this public policy justifies withholding tax

Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890), where a religious corporation was dissolved

because it violated the public policy favoring monogamy. Other cited cases deal with restrictions
on religious freedom necessary to control smallpox, protect children from exploitative labor, conscientious objection, and contributions to the social security system. Id.
144. Id.
145. Where the government's interest is overriding, the Supreme Court will inquire as to
whether accommodating the religious belief in question will unduly interfere with fulfillment of the
government's interest. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982); see also Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961). The Court has phrased this requirement in other cases as requiring

the government to use the "least restrictive means" to achieve its interests. Thomas v. Review
Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). For a discussion of possible
differences between these standards, see Schachner, supra note 67, at 305.
146. 455 U.S. 252, (1982).
147. See id. at 260-61. Similarly, in Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. I (1890) a case particularly relied on by the court, the government's interest was in preventing criminal behavior (polygamy) not in upholding its public policy.
148. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

149.

461 U.S. at 594-95. The Court illustrated the presence of the policy by reference to

governmental actions concerning education, voting rights, federal employment, selective service and
housing. The Court indicated that there were many more examples that would show this public

policy. Id.
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exemptions from many discriminatory organizations, it by no means follows
50
that the exemption may be denied to a racially restrictive church.1
VII.

CONCLUSION

While the decision in Church of Scientology reaches the correct result, the Tax
Court addressed too many issues in reaching it. Except for the complex facts
and effective delay tactics, this case presents the same questions as do the
numerous tax-motivated religions that are frequently before the courts. Ultimately the only issue in these cases is inurement; was the organization in
question organized and operated for religious purposes or for the benefit of
private individuals. 5 1 Since there was overwhelming evidence that the church
was deliberately structured to allow the founder, his family and friends to reap
a fortune from it, it is difficult to understand why the court also addressed
difficult constitutional questions.
Although the facts support the court's holding-that the IRS' actions against
the church were not motivated by religious hostility, the court's conclusion that
such hostility would have been irrelevant is too broad. Certainly a governmental
policy which selects religious organizations for audit on the basis of their religious beliefs would taint the proceedings in some way.
The court's application of the Bob Jones public policy standard to churches
appears unfounded. Whether a particular church or religion provides a public
benefit is an unanswerable question and therefore cannot provide the basis for
determining tax exempt status. Under our constitutional framework, all religions
must be considered equally beneficial. This constitutional premise may be considered a public policy that prohibits the kind of inquiry into religion which
was permitted with respect to educational institutions in Bob Jones.

150. The different impact of these standards may also be seen in the Church of Scientology
situation. The church contended that penalizing the entire Church of Scientology for the misconduct
of its officials violated its free association and free exercise rights. 83 T.C. at 503. Since the
government's interests can be protected through criminal prosectuion of the officials, revoking the
church's exemption is an unwarranted restriction of first amendment rights. Id. Similarly, under
charitable trust law, a trust formed for legitimate purposes is not invalid simply because illegal
means have been used to accomplish these purposes. Id. citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs,
S 377, comment d (1959).
Although the issue appears to be the same under the first amendment 'and the trust law, the
considerations are quite different. The Tax Court did not show that the church's interests could
not be accommodated by removal and prosecution of the offending officers, or that revocation was
the least restrictive means available. Instead, it focused on the fundamental public policy behind
the criminal conspiracy statutes. Under a constitutional analysis, this policy should be irrelevant
if the church officials could be separated from the church itself.
151. I.R.C. S 501(cX3) (1982) provides in pertinent part that an organization must be organized and operated so that "no part of [its] net earnings.. .inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual ......
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